The development of a secure physical RNG is a two-fold challenge. First of all, an appropriate design has to be implemented carefully. Secondly, evidence shall be given that the design itself and in particular the concrete implementation are indeed secure, and this task may be even more challenging. We briefly address general aspects that reliable security evaluations of physical RNGs should take into account. We discuss a performant RNG design that is based on pairs of noisy diodes. We formulate and analyze a stochastic model that interestingly also fits to other RNG designs. We prove a theorem that provides tight lower bounds for the entropy per random bit, and we apply these results to a prototype of a physical RNG. Principally, this RNG could generate up to 700 000 random bits per second with average entropy > 1 − 10 −5 .
Introduction
Many cryptographic mechanisms require random numbers, e.g. as session keys, signature parameters, ephemeral keys (DSA, ECDSA), zero-knowledge protocols, challenge response-protocols, nonces. Inappropriate RNGs may totally weaken principally strong cryptosystems, e.g. if an adversary is able to determine session keys. Ideally, random numbers were uniformly distributed on their range and independent. However, this condition characterizes an ideal RNG, which is a mathematical construction (lastly a fiction). Following [10] (cf. [24] for further explanations) 'real-world' RNGs can be divided into two classes, which comprise the true RNGs (TRNGs) and the deterministic RNGs (DRNGs; aka pseudorandom number generators), respectively. The TRNGs fall into two subclasses: Physical TRNGs use non-deterministic effects of electronic circuits (e.g. shot noise from Zener diode, inherent semiconductor thermal noise, free running oscillators) or physical experiments (e.g., time between emissions of radioactive decay, quantum photon effects). Non-physical non-deterministic RNGs exploit non-deterministic events (e.g., system time, hard disk seek time RAM content, user interaction). So-called hybrid RNGs combine design elements from both, TRNGs and DRNGs.
Unlike for deterministic RNGs it is hardly possible to specify approved designs for physical RNGs since security-relevant properties depend on the concrete implementation. A designer of a physical RNG is faced with two challenges. At first he has to develop an appropriate design and to implement it carefully. The second task may be even more difficult, namely to give evidence that the generic design and its implementation are indeed secure.
In the last years various designs of physical RNGs have been proposed [5] [6] [7] [8] 14] , and several evaluation guidances and standards were developed and became effective [1, 19, 2, 12, 10] . These documents define properties that strong RNGs should fulfil, and the evaluation guidances (cf. [1, 19, 2, 12] ) explain how these criteria shall be validated. A comprehensive treatment of evaluation aspects for physical RNGs are given in [25] .
In Section 2 we briefly address central aspects and goals that reliable security evaluations of physical RNGs should consider. In Section 3 we discuss an RNG design that exploits a pair of noisy diodes. In Section 4 we formulate and analyze a stochastic model that fits to this design and, interestingly, also to other RNG designs. In particular, we prove a theorem that allows to quantify a tight lower bound for the average entropy per random bit. We use our results to verify that a particular physical RNG might principally output up to 700 kBit random numbers with average entropy per random bit > 1 − 10 −5 . We discuss a generic online test scheme that is tailored to RNG designs which to the analyzed stochastic model. The paper ends with final remarks.
Evaluation of Physical RNGs: Fundamental Aspects
In this section we address central aspects that are relevant for security evaluations of physical RNGs. For a comprehensive treatment of this topic we refer the interested reader to [24, 25, 21] .
Entropy
With regard to Section 4 we extend the common definition of Shannon entropy from finite to (infinite) countable sets Ω (e.g. Ω = IN 0 ). More precisely, to a random variable X that assumes values in a Ω we assign H(X) := − ω∈Ω Prob(X = ω) log 2 (Prob(X = ω)).
(1)
According to the common convention we denote the Shannon entropy briefly as 'entropy' in the following.
where H(X) = ∞ is principally possible for non-finite range of X. The 'auxiliary' random variables V (s ) which will be of particular importance in Section 4) yet have finite entropy for any s ∈ (0, ∞) (cf. [22] , Lemma 2(ii)).
(ii) Physical RNGs can usually be modelled by stationary stochastic processes (cf. Sect. 4) . The internal random numbers (cf. Definition 1) typically assume values in Ω = {0, 1}, and for all cases of practical relevance the Shannon entropy per internal random bit is in a vicinity of 1. Hence the Shannon entropy provides a sound estimate for the average guessing workload, which justifies the use of the Shannon entropy for physical RNGs in place of the more conservative min-entropy. (Min-entropy may be more suitable than the Shannon entropy for specific guessing problems that deal with very imbalanced probability distributions.) We point out in many cases it is much easier to compute the Shannon entropy than the min-entropy (cf. [24] , Subsect. 5.2, for a more comprehensive treatment of this question).
Central Definitions and Goals
The core of a physical RNG is its noise source (noisy diode(s), oscillators etc.) Normally, the noise source produces a time-continuous analog signal that is (usually) digitized after uniform time intervals. The digitized values are called das random numbers where 'das' stands for digital analog signal . The das-random numbers may be algorithmically postprocessed, giving the so-called internal random numbers. Algorithmic postprocessing may increase the entropy per bit, but only at cost of performance (data compression). If the entropy of the das-random numbers is sufficiently large the algorithmic postprocessing may be saved in favour of better performance. Online and tot tests shall detect non-tolerable weaknesses while the RNG is in operation, e.g. caused by a total breakdown of the noise source. Upon external request the RNG outputs external random numbers.
The evaluation of physical RNGs falls into two parts. At first the generic design has to be considered. The central goal is to quantify (at least a lower bound for) the entropy per random bit. Unfortunately, entropy cannot be measured as voltage or temperature. Instead, entropy is a property of random variables and not of observed realizations. In particular, entropy cannot be ensured by passing a collection of statistical blackbox tests [21] . Note that usually even pseudorandom sequences pass these tests. To quantify entropy we have to study the distribution of the random numbers, or more precisely, the distribution of the underlying random variables. Definition 1. Random variables are denoted with capital letters. Realizations of these random variables, i.e. values that are assumed by these random variables, are denoted by the respective small letters. For instance, the das random numbers r 1 , r 2 , . . . are interpreted as realizations of random variables R 1 ,
We denote the internal random numbers and the underlying random variables by y 1 ,
External random numbers are not under control of the RNG designer. Since the external random numbers are usually concatenations of the internal random numbers it is yet natural to focus on
which corresponds to the real-life situation that an adversary knows a subsequence y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n of internal random numbers, e.g. due to openly transmitted challenges or session keys which the adversary received legitimately.
In the following the random variables R 1 , R 2 , . . . describe the stochastic behaviour of the das random numbers. Their distributions clearly depend on the noise source and the digitization mechanism. Usually, it is not feasible to determine these distributions exactly. At least in a strict sense the exact distribution depends on the characteristics of the components of the particular noise source, and these characteristics may differ to some extent even for RNGs from the same production series. A sound security evaluation of a physical RNG should be based on a stochastic model .
Stochastic Model.
Ideally, the stochastic model comprises a family of distributions that contains the distribution of the internal random numbers. Since this is often too complicated in practice it suffices if the stochastic model defines a family of probability distributions that contains the distribution of the dasrandom numbers or even merely of 'auxiliary' random variables provided that this is sufficient to attain our declared goal , namely to verify a lower entropy bound for the internal random numbers. (This is the case in Sect. 4, for instance.) Example 1. (Repeated tossing of a single coin) Since coins have no memory it is reasonable to assume that the random variables R j are independent and binomially B(1, p)-distributed with p ∈ [0, 1], defining a one-parameter family of probability distributions. Given a particular coin the parameter p may be guessed by tossing it a large number of times. The estimate p can be used to estimate the entropy. The entropy of the internal random numbers depends on p and the algorithmic postprocessing (if there is any).
For 'real life' RNGs formulation and analysis of the stochastic model is usually more complicated than in Example 1. For most RNG designs it is reasonable to assume that the sequence R 1 , R 2 , . . . is (strictly) stationary (i.e. timeinvariant), at least within time periods that are large compared to the output rate. Drifts of process parameters within the life cycle of the RNG (e.g. due to ageing effects) are not problematic if the distribution remains in the acceptable part of the specified class. In a first step we are interested in
for any history r 1 , . . . , r n , or at least in the average conditional entropy
For dependent random variables the calculation of (4) is in general easier than (3). Due to tolerances of components, ageing effects or because of a total breakdown of the noise source a concrete RNG may output considerably weaker random numbers than the carefully investigated RNG prototypes. Online tests and tot tests ('total failure test') shall detect non-tolerable weaknesses while the RNG is in operation. There do not exist statistical tests that are universally strong for any RNG design. Instead, tests should be tailored to the stochastic model of the das random numbers. Depending on the conditions of use (strength of the device that contains the RNG, environmental conditions etc.) it may also be necessary that the design is also be resistant against active adversaries; at least physical sensors or the online test should detect induced weaknesses. The second task in a security evaluation is thus to verify the effectiveness of the online and tot tests and the consequence of noise alarms [20, 21, 25] . We will briefly address these aspects in Section 6.
Remark 2.
A reasonable stochastic model is the core of any CC (Common Criteria) evaluation with regard to the evaluation guidance AIS 31 [2, 12] , which has been effective in Germany since 2001. We point out that besides physical RNGs with cryptographic postprocessing the international ISO norm [10] also permits physical RNGs without cryptographic postprocessing if a sound stochastic model confirms that the random numbers have enough entropy and if effective online tests are applied.
3 An RNG based on Noisy Diodes Figure 3 illustrates the principle of RNG which random source consists of two identical noisy diodes. E.g. Zener diodes have a reverse avalanched (depending on diode type 3 -4 Volt or about 10 V) and produce more than 1mV noisy voltage on about 10 MHz. The outlets of both diodes are symmetrically input to an operational amplifier in order to amplify the difference of noise voltages.
We first point out that a construction with only one noisy diode facilitates a manipulation by active adversaries, e.g. by external electromagnetic fields. The circuitry of AC coupling, the negative feedback for the operational amplifier, the stabilizing the power supply or compensating effects of temperature are not shown here. The operational amplifier output is provided to a Schmitt trigger where the mean voltage of the amplifier meets the threshold of the Schmitt trigger. The output signal of the Schmitt trigger consists of zeros and ones with random lengths. Its 0-1 crossings clock an intermediate flip-flop that inverts the D-input of the last flip-flop which is latched by the clock. The das random number r n is the number of 0-1-crossings within the n th clock cycle. Consequently, y n+1 = y n ⊕ r n+1 (mod 2) where y n and y n+1 denote the internal random numbers in
Step n and n + 1, respectively.
The quality of the das random numbers depends on the randomness of the number of these impulses between subsequents clock cycles. Unlike in a design that exploits both, 0-1-and 1-0-crossings it is irrelevant whether the intervals of 0 and 1 are identically distributed. This makes the design more robust on cost of halving the output rate. For this RNG design only the average length betwen consecutive 0-1-crossings is relevant for the 0/1-ratio of the das random numbers. The distribution of this length may also change, causing a smaller or larger number of switchings within the particular clock cycles. If this number becomes too small this may reduce entropy. However, online and tot test should detect such a behaviour (cf. Subsect.6).
One part of the tot test checks separately the generation of noisy voltage for each diode. It detects breakdown or anormality of the noise. The online test checks statistically the quality of the digitised noise signal. Clearly, long-term aging effects may be neglected in that regard.
Formulation and Analysis of the Stochastic Model
In this section we formulate and analyze a stochastic model for the RNG design dfrom the last section. Interestingly, the same stochastic model fits also to to other RNG designs as well (cf. Remark 3(i)).
In the following we assume that the analog part of the noise source is in equilibrium state (because a sufficient amount of time has passed since the start of the system; a fraction of a second should suffice). We start with the analysis of the das random numbers r 0 , r 1 , . . Fig. 1  and Fig. 2) . The Schmitt trigger switches at each 0-1 crossing of the voltage with the threshold value. The das random number r n denotes the number of 0-1-switchings of the Schmitt trigger in the time interval I n := (s n−1 , s n ] = ((n − 1)s, ns]. Clearly y n ≡ y n−1 + r n+1 ≡ y 0 + r 1 + · · · + r n (mod2) for n ≥ 1
where y 0 denotes the internal random number at time 0. Our goal is to determine a lower bound for
the conditional entropy per das-random number, resp. the conditional entropy per internal random number. Note that the second formula corresponds to the real-world situation where an adversary knows several internal random numbers y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n (cf. Sect. 2). Since the algorithmic postprocessing is very elementary results on the das random numbers can directly be transferred to the internal random numbers.
Definition 2. As usually, iid stands for 'independent and identically distributed'. A sequence of random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . is called stationary if for each r ≥ 1 the distribution of (X m+1 , . . . , X m+r ) does not depend on the shift parameter m.
The generalized variance of the sequence X 1 , X 2 , . . . is defined as
The sequence X 1 , X 2 , . . . is called q-dependent if the vectors (X 1 , . . . , X a ) and (X b , . . . , X n ) are independent whenever b − a > q.
As usually, N (µ, σ 2 ) denotes a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 . The cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
Stochastic Model. We interpret the lengths t 1 , t 2 , . . . of the time intervals between consecutive 0-1-switchings as realizations of a q-dependent stationary stochastic process T 1 , T 2 , . . .. We set µ := E(T 1 ) and σ 2 T := Var(T 1 ) while the generalized variance of T 1 , T 2 , . . . simplifies to
We assume σ 2 T > 0 (otherwise the das-random numbers were deterministic), E(|T j | 3 ) < ∞ (needed for the proof of Lemma 1(iii); cd. also Remark 3) and Prob(T 1 = 0) = 0. The term z n denotes the index of the first 0-1-switching that follows time s n = ns (i.e., when the clock latches the n th time) while w n := t zn − s n . That is, w n equals the time span from s n to the next 0 − 1-switching. In particular, w 0 + t 1 + · · · + t zn−1 ≤ s n < w 0 + t 1 + · · · + t zn . Recall that the stochastic model of an RNG shall allow to determine (a lower bound for) the conditional entropy H(Y n+1 | Y 0 , . . . , Y n ). This defines our central goal.
More abstract, the random variables can be described as follows:
Remark 3. (i) Relations (9) to (11) remain valid if we replace the two noisy diodes by a single diode. (ii) We note that (9) to (11) also fits to the RNG design that was introduced in [23] and analyzed intensively in [22] . We note that the noise source consisted of two independent ring oscillators. In [22] we assumed W 0 = 0 for simplicity, which had little impact since the ratio s/µ (and thus the das random numbers r 1 , r 2 , . . .) were very large.
(iii) The assumption that the T j are q-dependent may be relaxed as long as the central limit theorem (for dependent random variables) remains valid (cf. (16) , for instance).
For these reasons it is worthwhile to study the system (9) to (11) under general (weak) assumptions and for specific conditions on the distribution of the T j (e.g., for iid or Markovian T j ). Note, however, that even if the das random numbers of different RNGs can be modelled by the system (9) to (11) the distributions of the random variables T 1 , T 2 , . . . and, consequently, of R 1 , R 2 , . . . and Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . may be very different. Assumption. Lemma 2 (Appendix) considers the 'transfer' of the strict stationarity property. Unlike Prob(T j ≥ s) the probability Prob(T j ≥ s) is not exactly 0 but negligible (since µ s), and it is reasonable to assume that for 'large' index j the term T 1 + · · · + T j (mod s) is uniformly distributed on [0, s) (→ uniformity assumption on S j ). Note that the periods between 0 − 1 switchings from the start of the RNG to time 0 can be described by random variables T j with negative indices. The assumptions on the T j seem to be natural and very mild. With regard to Lemma 2 we may assume in the following that to the random variables (W j , R j ), R j , W j , Y j and Z j are stationary. Lemma 1 collects some useful properties that will be needed later. Note that (12) formally confirms our intuition that knowing more random numbers cannot weaken the adversary's position. We point out that (12) may become false without the stationarity property, namely when R n is easier to guess than R n+1 . Lemma 1.
In particular, lim n→∞ H(R n+1 | R 1 , . . . , R n ) and
(iii) The distributions of the random variables ( k j=1 T j − kµ)/( √ kσ) tend to the standard normal distribution as k tends to infinity. In particular,
for each x ∈ IR.
If the random variables T 1 , T 2 , . . . are iid the condition E(|T j | 3 ) < ∞ may be dropped, and in particular
The distribution of the random variable V (vµ) (or more precisely, its approximation given by (17) and (18)) depends only on the ratios µ/σ and u/µ = v but not on the absolute values of the parameters µ, σ 2 , u = vµ. The mass of V (vµ) is essentially concentrated on those k's with k ≈ v. Unless k is very small the interval
(v) (iid case) If the random variables T 1 , T 2 , . . . are iid then
for any distribution of W 1 . If (W n ) n∈N is stationary 'lim' may be omitted. If G T (·) is continuous (or equivalently, if Prob(T 1 = y) = 0 for all y ∈ [0, ∞)) then G W (·) has density g(x) := (1 − G T (x))/µ.
Proof.
By Assumption 4 the random variables R j and Y j are stationary. Hence, (e.g.)
and since entropy is non-negative this verifies (i). Assertions (ii), (iii) and the first assertions of (iv) follow from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2(ii) in [22] . We merely mention that (ii) applies a version of the Central Limit Theorem for dependent random variables that was proved in [11] . The remaining assertions in (iv) demand elementary but careful computations. (Note that ( (20) was verified in [9] (4.10), and the second assertion of (v) follows by differentiation.
Under mild regularity assumptions on the T 1 , T 2 , . . . plausible heuristic arguments indicate that
(21) for moderate parameter a > 0. We point out that for n = 0 or if the T j are iid (21) is valid for any positive a. Due to the lack of space we omit details. Theorem 1 collects central results. Theorem 1 focuses on the entropy of the internal random numbers. Cancelling the term '(mod 2)' in (24) 
with equality for iid random variables T j .
(ii) Substituting the integrands in (22) to (24) by Prob(V (s−u) = k − 1 | W 0 = u), Prob(V (s−u) ≡ k − 1(mod 2) | W 0 = u), and H(V (s−u) (mod 2) | W 0 = u), resp., provides equality also for the general case. Note that for dependent T j the conditional terms implicitly define conditions on the random variables T 1 , T 2 , . . . and thus on V (s−u) . (iii) (iid case) If the sequence T 1 , T 2 , . . . is iid
If G T (·) is continuous the right-hand side of (25) reads
with equality for iid random variables T j . The stationarity of the R j implies (22) to (24) and (ii) follow immediately from the stationarity of the random variables R 1 , R 2 , . . ., W 1 , W 2 , . . . and Y 1 , Y 2 , . . ., respectively. Within this proof ν n and ν n|y0,. . .,yn denotes the distribution of W n , resp. of the conditional random variable (W n | Y 0 = y 0 , . . . , Y n = y n ). In this notation
If the T j are iid for all n ∈ N the vector (T zn+1 , T zn+1+2 , . . .) is distributed as (T 1 , T 2 , . . .), regardless of u and the history y 0 , . . . , y n . In particular, the integrand of the right-hand side of (30) only depends on u. More precisely, for any y 0 , . . . , y n it equals H(V (s−u) + 1(mod 2)) = H(V (s−u) )(mod 2). Altogether The entries from Table 1 were computed with Theorem 1; we used (28), (29) and (26). We point out that inequality (21) provides more pessimistic lower entropy bounds for H(Y n+1 | Y 1 , . . . , Y n ), namely 0.333, 0.333, 0.333, 0.801, and 0.988. Compared to Var(R 1 ) and cov(R 1 , R 2 ) the covariances cov(R n , R n+k ) are negligible for k ≥ 2.
Practical Experiments
As pointed out in Remark 3 relations (9) to (11) fit to various RNG designs. The distribution of the random variables T j and thus of R j and Y j yet depend on the design but also on the concrete implementation. We performed measurements for a prototype 3 of a particular physical RNG (cf. Fig. 2 that uses the generic design discussed in Sect. 3 . Large measurement series verified that both the intermediate times between (0-1)-and (1-0)-crossings as well as the intermediate times between (1-0)-and (0-1)-crossings identically exponentially distributed. Figure 2 shows the relative frequencies of period lengths between consecutive 0-1-crossings. For the statistical calculations the statistical environment "R" (cf. www.r-project.org) was used.
The average period length is ≈ 128.9 ns so that the RNG could output 700 kBit random numbers if s = 10.5 · 128.9 ns, for instance. Maximum-Likelihood tests indicate that the one-dimensional empirical distribution from Figure 2 can be approximated by an Erlang(0.0155/ns, 2)-distribution. Contingency tests did not contradict the hypothesis that T j and T j+1 are independent (97 from 99 tests with significance level 0.01 were passed). Thus we used Example 2 (cf. Table1) to conclude that H(Y n+1 | Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) > 1 − 10 −5 for s = 10.5 · 128.9 ns. We mention that this conclusion is supported by Remark 5 and the fact that for the (exact) Erlang distribution even considerably smaller s suffices to guarantee this bound.
We point out that Theorem 1 can also directly be applied to empirical data. This is in particular relevant if the empirical distribution cannot be approximated by any 'well-known' distribution. Of course, an approximator for G T (·) follows immediately from the empirical distribution of the lengths t j . If the T j are iid with density this approximator can be substituted into (26). For arbitrary T j to given clock cycle length s the cumulative distribution function G W may be estimated from traces t 1 , t 2 , . . .. We are going to implement such a routine in "R", which shall enables us to verify the entropy bound 1 − 10 −5 with an alternative approach.
Online Tests
The conditional entropy H(Y n+1 | Y 0 , . . . , Y n ) is closely related to the entropy of the random variables V (s−u) (cf. Theorem 1 and (21)). By (17) and (18)the entropy H(V (s−u) ) depends only on the ratios µ/σ and (s − u)/µ. Moreover, unless the cycle length s of the external clock is small compared to µ arguments u with s − u ≈ s) provide the esential contribution to the integral. Since s is assumed to be fixed it is natural (and effective) to estimate the process parameters µ = E(T j ) and the generalized variance σ 2 of T 1 , T 2 , . . . (cf. (7)) while the RNG is in operation. Unfortunately, this required an internal clock with high resolution, which may be too costly for many applications. For most applications it is more convenient to check the process parameters µ and σ 2 indirectly, namely by estimating the mean value µ R := E(R j ) and the generalized variance of the stationary sequence R 1 , R 2 , . . .. In a first step, appropriate intervals I µ and I σ 2 for the process parameters µ and σ 2 have to be specified. Applying Theorem 1(iv) yields intervals I µ R and I σ 2 R that contain µ R and σ 2 R if µ and σ 2 are contained in I µ and I σ 2 . For a physical RNG that meets (9) to (11) we propose the following generic test procedure. Input data for the statistical tests are das random numbers r 1 , . . . , r m+M .
-Compute av(r 1 , . . . , r m ) := (r 1 + · · · + r m )/m. • (tot test) If av(r 1 , . . . , r m ) < a ⇒ noise alarm • (online test) If av(r 1 , . . . , r m ) / ∈ [b 1 , b 2 ] ⇒ noise alarm -(online test) Use das random numbers r m+1 , . . . , r m+M to decide whether σ 2 R ∈ [c 1 , c 2 ]. If the decision is negative: ⇒ noise alarm Due to the limited task of a tot test the parameter a may be selected very small to prevent false noise alarms. Alternatively, this task may be covered by a physical sensor. The parameters b 1 , b 2 , c 1 , c 2 must fulfil I µ R ⊆ [b 1 , b 2 ] and I σ 2 R ⊆ [c 1 , c 2 ]. As usual, the selection of these parameters depends on the application scheme of the online test (continuously, on demand etc.).
The distribution of av(R 1 , . . . , R m ) can be computed by (22) with upper integration boundary ms in place of s. Alternatively, the central limit theorem (which holds under weak assumptions on the R j ) might be applied to the random variablers R j since µ R and σ 2 R can be computed with (29). The second online test should be tailored to the distribution of the random variables R j for the concrete RNG. The generalized variance σ 2 R can be estimated directly, or the relevant set of covariances cov(R n , R n+k ) may be estimated. A precise computation of the failure probability for [c 1 , c 2 ] is more complicated than for the arithmetic mean. (Selecting large sample size M may simplify this problem.) Typically, joint moments (e.g. E(R j−1 R 2 j R j+1 )) have to be computed. This may be done on basis of theoretical considerations or on measurement series, or by stochastic simulations (with pseudorandom numbers t 1 , t 2 , . . . that are generated with regard to the specified distribution of the random variables T j ).
For the RNG considered in Section 5 (Erlang distribution) σ 2 and thus µ R and σ 2 R are functions of µ. If influences from possible fault attacks will either reliably be detected by physical sensors or prevented by the implementtation, the second online test might be dropped.
